A Closer Look at Nazi Propaganda

A Closer Look at Nazi Propaganda Andy Hill

Propaganda should be popular, not intellectually pleasing.1 -Josef Goebbels Last summer there was a beer advertisement that specifically caught my eye one day driving to school. The billboard piece was advertising some new low-carbohydrate beer by Michelob, depicting a young blond woman in her twenties, raising a barbell, with a muscular, younger man immediately behind her. Obviously, beer and weight lifting have little to do with one another. The presentation was interesting, however. As is commonplace, the sexual appeal of the woman was being not only exploited, but contorted into having an organic connection with beer. The familiar message was being passed on that woman should be physically attractive to be of worth, have blond hair (also a familiar lever), and keep in good shape by performing such activities as frequenting gymnasiums and, of course, drinking beer. The man was placed behind her for several probable reasons. The first was to suggest an inherently feminine dependence on the masculine, denoting that a strong woman does not exist anywhere without a stronger man behind her, in some fashion. Secondly, the man was placed behind her for sexually literal reasons, a show of domination, to allow the prepositional disposition of the man to fester into fantasy in the mind of male passers-by. This is called propaganda. It is a particular type of propaganda, somewhat different from political or social propaganda, but it is propaganda nonetheless. The modern term is ‘public-relations.' We could continue down this road and discover several illuminating points, however my object in opening this paper with this anecdote is illustrative. As the topic of this paper is Nazi propaganda methodology, it must be understood what propaganda is, where its use originated, and how it still affects us today. In this paper, I intend to briefly investigate the history of propaganda as a technique of opinion influence, to broadly examine the trends and patterns in the use of it by the Nazis, and afterwards to see if we can draw any parallels between then and now. I. A Brief History of Propaganda If we want to understand the history of state-sponsored propaganda, specifically where its birthplace was, we need not look any further than the administration of Woodrow Wilson. In 1917, Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) in order to sell the prospect of American involvement in World War I to a domestic population that was overwhelmingly opposed to the idea. Wilson tapped George Creel, a young muckracking journalist from Colorado to head the newly formed government agency, which would specialize in film, print-media, cross-country public speaking campaigns, and a host of other outlets. Under Creel's leadership, the CPI became an astonishingly modern, effective propaganda machine. Armed with a firm grasp of how to affect the emotions and sentiments of the masses in order to achieve a level of apathy and agreeability conducive to selling any government action, Creel turned to the private sector for creative support. Using CPI funds to contract Hollywood filmmakers in the art of patriotism, silent films were made, accompanied by piano-thumping military numbers to assist the bewildered herd in opinion development. Of the many divisions that the CPI consisted of, it was the Division of Pictorial Publicity which, among many others, sought artist James Montgomery Flagg to create the now famous "I Want You" poster with Uncle Sam extending his finger in a recruitment measure.2 An early member of the CPI, from 1917, was an Austrian-born immigrant by the name of Edward Bernays. Bernays combined his understanding of the work of his uncle Sigmund Freud with the objectives of influencing public opinion. It was Bernays who coined the term "public relations," as a nicer-sounding alternative to the negative connotations of "propaganda," and joined forces with the liberal journalist Walter Lippman in executing the desires of Wilson to "sell the war" to the American Public. Bernays would go on to write many books on the subject of propaganda, one entitled Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) and later Propaganda, published in 1928. Taking the skills he learned with the CPI beyond the frontiers of war and moving them to Madison Avenue, he created the first American public relations firm. One of his notorious successes in this field was to supply the participants of a women's rights march in New York with Lucky Strike cigarettes, or "torches of freedom," in response to meager tobacco sales in the post-war period.3 Writing in his most famous work Propaganda, Bernays wrote: "If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, it is now possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing it." He called this the "engineering of consent," and made references to an "invisible government" which was the "true ruling power of our country." Later in the book, Bernays wrote: "as civilization has become more complex," and as "the technical means have been invented and developed by which opinion may be regimented," an increasing amount of what our elected officials exhort publicly are determined by "shrewd persons operating behind the scenes."4 Together the CPI and Bernays' involvement in it created one of the most massive industries in America: public relations. However, none of the achievements of Bernays rank as high as providing inspiration to a young doctor on the other side of the Atlantic, a man by the name of Josef Goebbels. II. The Methodology of Nazi Propaganda The Nazis were absolute masters in the art of propaganda. One would be hard pressed to find two people with a more outspoken, clear understanding of what makes good propaganda than Adolph Hitler and Josef Goebbels. Every single possible medium was used exhaustively, namely mass rallies, the press, radio, theatre, film, pamphlets, books, and posters. The organization of the party's propaganda aims changed significantly after Hitler achieved the Chancellorship on 30 January, 1933, however the basic institutional framework was intact by 1930. By the time Goebbels became the head of the Reich propaganda department on 27 April, it was a division of the party that was represented at all levels. At the regional level, the Gau, or party headquarters, had its own propaganda department with a chief, which in turn had different local branches with propaganda officials. This made it so that the propaganda of the party could be nuanced accordingly down to the finest detail. If a rally was planned in a small, rural town, then "the speaker should be fairly well informed about specifically rural questions."5 If it was held in Berlin, the presentation of the rally would be drastically different. One of the special roles of the local and regional propaganda chiefs was to be the eyes and ears for the higher echelons of the party, which could not as easily determine local differences and preferences. It was an extremely rigid, top-down structure, but quite efficient, as the local bodies were able to not only receive direction, but were able to send this valuable information back to the national headquarters. Nazism always had a clearly recognizable activist quality, and relied heavily on young people and locals to announce its presence in the area. As television was not widespread at this time in Germany, and radio airplay was difficult to consistently deliver a message before the acquisition of power in 1933, the most lucrative form of propaganda used was the mass-rally. In a July 1931 issue of Wille und Weg, the monthly publication of the Reich propaganda department, instructions for the organisation of these massrallies list several instructive points. Party members would distribute "written personal invitations to every farmer or inhabitant," and would make sure that one village was saturated with news of the event while another was left alone. The purpose being that when the party came back to the area, they would hold a rally at a neighbouring village, then the event would seem like it was being held especially for that one small village. Obviously people from the village that was visited first would come to the later one in the neighbouring village. After the meeting, the SA band would serenade a grand "German Evening," a celebration of German traditions and heritage, while finances were collected. A note is made on the surprisingly high amount of donations to "be got out of a meeting" if plates and not caps were used for collection.6 Utilizing this and other similar methods, the Nazis were able to spread their influence over all sectors of Germany. Each local branch was specialized to convey National Socialism in the most appropriate way that was necessary for the area. As Goebbels said, "propaganda adjusts itself to the prevailing conditions . . . it is always flexible."7 Another tactic used was to make it appear that the Nazis could and did represent many different causes. For this reason, party members specifically attempted to infiltrate different organizations from the bottom up, and to "arrange the entry of NSDAP members into the executive committee and Association leadership."8 Additionally, the Nazis created Party organizations for "doctors, lawyers, teachers, war-disabled and warpensioners, and civil servants," among many others.9 The highly efficient nature of the Reich propaganda department was able to assist the rise of the Nazis to official power, and to pave the way for the much more prolific Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment (MPPE), headed also by Goebbels. Created by cabinet decree on 13 March 1933, the purpose of the MPPE was defined as the spreading of "enlightenment and propaganda within the population concerning the policy of the Reich government and the national reconstruction of the German Fatherland."10 As Goebbels stated in a press conference two days later, the creation of the MPPE was "revolutionary" in that the new government no longer had the intentions of leaving "the people to their own devices," and that this made the government a "people's government." We will not waste time trying to understand what exactly he could have meant by this rhetorical flourish. The important fact was that, with the creation of the MPPE, Goebbels saw the "living contact between the national government, as the expression of the people's will, and the people themselves." Further along in his speech, it was stated that ". . .It is not enough for people to be more or less reconciled to our regime, to be persuaded to adopt a neutral attitude towards us, rather we want to work on people until they have capitulated to us, until they grasp ideologically that what is happening in Germany today not only must be accepted but also can be accepted."11 The Radio Another powerful medium that Hitler and Goebbels were very keen on exploiting was radio. Several months transpired, between Hitler's achievement of the chancellorship and the end of June, 1933, in which Goebbels was busy coordinating the power of the MPPE over radio. When Hitler became chancellor, German radio was loosely monitored and controlled by the Reich Radio Commissioner of the Minister of Posts and the Reich Radio Commissioner of the Minister of Interior. Most of the stations were regionally operated, and were subject to differences of opinion and political persuasion according to their regional location. During the election period of 1 February-4March, 1933, the nationalist parties were able to secure an agreement, which allotted to them all of the forty-five political broadcasts between them; no other parties were allowed radio advertisement. Soon after, as the text states, "the two Reich radio commissioners were replaced as well as the controller of Berlin radio."12 Although Goebbels came into conflict with Prussian Minister of the Interior Hermann Goring over who was to control the sought-after medium, intervention by Hitler in the form of a 30 June decree sealed the issue, handing over the rights to the radio to the MPPE. After 1 April, 1934, the entirety of German radio was consolidated into the Reich Radio Company, fully under the control of Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry. During the first six months of 1933, approximately thirteen percent of the broadcasting personnel were dismissed from their jobs. Goebbels thought very highly of radio and its prospects for indoctrination. In a 25 March, 19333 address to the Controllers of German radio, he stated his intentions of "placing the radio in the service of our ideology," and that "no other ideology will find expression here." He continued to explain that the radio was the "most modern and the most crucial instrument that exists for influencing the masses." Goebbels' first principle of broadcasting instruction was to "avoid being boring," as the idea was not to cram "patriotic verse" and "military music" down the throats of the listeners, but to create airy, entertaining programs which could sustain the listener's attention, without lapsing too deeply into political or social issues.13 The radio was to be a one-way conduit of (mis)information from the party to the citizenry, and was to also provide light entertainment and news that the party deemed accessible for public consumption. This was aided by the instigation by the Reich of large-scale, cheap radio manufacturing, with the help of a few industrialists. There were two versions. One was a 75 RPM model, and the other was a 35 RPM "people's receiver," payable in installments. Seventy percent of German homes had a radio by 1939, "the highest percentage of radio ownership in the world."14 The power of radio for propaganda purposes was greatly augmented by the construction of thousands of loudspeaker columns, first in Breslau in 1938, then elsewhere. This was influential, as "it was believed that the impact of rallies and speeches broadcast on radio would be greater if they were listened to in public where people would be more suggestible than in their familiar home surroundings." Enjoyment of the Fuhrer's speeches via radio in this community-format was highly affective at giving the party a type of sensory omnipresence it had not enjoyed to this extent before. Besides fostering a feigned sense of togetherness with one's fellow radio listeners, the use of public loudspeaker columns also served the purpose of providing a "direct and rapid means of issuing orders," according to State Secretary Hanke of the Propaganda Ministry.15 The Press According to Volume II of the reader by Noakes & Pridham, three main policies were pursued in the gradual coordination of Nazi control over the press. Primarily, strict controls were placed on publishers and journalists. No doubt this included much selfcensorship, as well as severity from above, such as the fear of losing one's job. Secondly, the party's publishing house (the Eher Verlag) came to own most of the German press. Thirdly, the MPPE was able to effectively control what news ended up in the news via a constant rush of "directives issued at daily press conferences."16 Some organizations sought to save themselves from complete Nazi takeover, and implemented measures meant to ease the ferocity of the takeover on their organization, such as the German publisher's association, the VDZV. They appointed the head of the Eher Verlag, Max Amman, as chairman on 28 June 1933. They also took the initiative and rid their organization of all "politically obnoxious" members, replacing them all with Nazis. The Reich Association of the German press, the journalists' organization, also took similar aims. Nazi Press Chief Otto Dietrich was appointed chairman on 30 April, 1933, while it was simultaneously announced that a new standard of "racial and political reliability" would be coming into effect.17 However, the most important achievement of the Nazis in consolidating their hold over the national press was with the passing of the "Editors' Law" on 4 October 1933. The actual legislation appears an impressive monument to state power and authority. The new rubric for editorship was not so much based on merit or journalistic skill, but the status of German citizenship, descent of the subject and their spouse being of Aryan descent, and the possession of the "qualities which the task of exerting intellectual influence on the public requires," among others. Nothing could make it into the papers which could "weaken the strength of the German Reich abroad or at home, the community will of the German people, German defence, culture or the economy." The law made all editors responsible for the "intellectual content" and "stance" of all texts in the publication. The word "public" is used repeatedly in the document, referring to the "public professional duties of an editor," the "public good," and the "public" status that the Reich Association was granted by the law. Furthermore, Goebbels was hence appointed President of the Association, and was given control over who was admitted into it and who wasn't. The results: "By 1935 1,300 ‘Jewish and Marxist' journalists had been purged from the profession."18 As the reader states: In 1933 Germany had more daily newspapers than the United States and more than the combined total for France, Britain, and Italy. The city of Stuttgart alone (pop. 400,000) had nine and Stettin (pop. 254,000) five. Most small rural towns had at least one. Most of these papers were uneconomic and had been badly hit by the depression. At the end of 1932, the 59 Nazi daily newspapers had a combined circulation of only 782,121 and accounted for only 2.5 percent of the total. They were poor in quality and had suffered from continual financial difficulties.19 Despite their slow start in the field of good newspaper making, the Nazis were able to, in a very short amount of time, take almost complete control over every above-ground publication in the entire country with the passing of the Editor's Law. Another means that was used to control the press was through the aforementioned press conferences, held daily. Some of the documents in the book provide illuminating examples of the degree of control that the Nazis maintained over the written word. One of the directives instructs journalists to not publish pictures of members of the government sitting "at dining tables in front of rows of bottles," as to the "utterly absurd" impression that had been created that government personnel were "living it up." It goes on to explain that the Ministers took part in official social events for "reasons of international etiquette," which they regarded "merely as a duty and not a pleasure." A directive was issued the day after the infamous kristallnacht, or ‘night of broken glass.' Instructions were given so as to report that "here and there windows had been broken and synagogues had gone up in flames," and additionally stated that "no front page headlines" could contain information on what happened the night before. It encouraged writing that "there had been understandable indignation and corresponding actions by the population" in various parts of country, however it was to be reported on in such a way so as to make it appear as a spontaneous occurrence, without any government planning.20 Other directives relayed such wisdom as "peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups in the same state is inconceivable," and instructed the press to so structure their scope of debate and opinion. As to the Czech issue, the editors were told that the official intellectual fare was that "Germany is peaceful," but the Czechs "go in for reckless terrorism." Also, the "military measures" of the Czechs must be denounced while the press must also "demand their revocation."21 Of course, demonization of official enemies while correspondingly polishing the image of the home state is a tactic that has long since left the whole process, right? The Arts Similar moves were made as regarded the arts that were made to restrict the press. With a law passed on 22 September 1933, a Reich Chamber of the Press was created, along with Reich Chambers of literature, radio, theatre, music, and creative arts. Anyone who maintained a profession in any of these spheres of culture had to join these new organizations. With the passing of this law, the Nazis were able to do with the rest of the arts what they did to the press with the Editor's Law. Another ingenious idea of the MPPE was to punish so-called "degenerate art," by placing it in shows labelled as such, so that the citizenry could attend and see what type of art it was that they were not allowed to appreciate. When the House of German Art was opened in Munich on 19 July 1937, an "officially approved" show was held in contrast to an exhibition of "degenerate art" held across the street in a different building.22 At the opening, Hitler gave a speech explaining his feelings about art and what art should be, as once upon a time he sketched postcards on the streets of Vienna, rejected from art school. In a denunciation of modern, abstract painting, Hitler proposed two solutions for the painter who dared to present the world in a subjective light: to cure the "ghastly defect of vision" of the painter, or if his/her eyesight is found to be actually healthy, then the matter should be referred to a "criminal court." He continued to elaborate on modern art, noting its "impudent and shameless arrogance" and its "deplorable lack of skill." Hitler advised that the viewers of this new national art should "recognize in me its own spokesman and counsellor," and that this would create a "sigh of relief," followed by an "agreement with this purification of art."23 In another example of the Nazification of art that occurred under the hand of the MPPE, the main German student body organized a book burning festival for 10 May 1933. Most of the titles were selected randomly, from authors who were deemed to be undesirable, among them Helen Keller. The scene was described by the head of the Associated Press Bureau in Berlin, Louis P. Lochner. As public and private libraries were raided, the stolen books were thrown into a large fire in a public square, near the University of Berlin. As night fell, the "howling mob" of students continued to perform "Indian dances and incantations as the flames began to soar skyward." Later on, Goebbels himself arrived in a motorcade and congratulated the student body on their heroic act of patriotism, declaring the "age of extreme Jewish intellectualism" to be at its end.24 Other Means of Indoctrination Another way of instilling certain values and habits into people was through social indoctrination. The Nazis thus made attempts to control many facets of the public sphere. A State Minister from Hesse made an official instruction to all state and local authorities on 7 February 1935 that the ‘Heil Hitler' greeting was now mandatory for all "civil servants, employees, and workers in the public service." This was to be additionally followed up on "outside working hours as well." Fortunately, permission was granted by the Minister to use one's left arm in the salute, "in the case of physical disability" which would bar the use of the right arm.25 Another tactic of social indoctrination was through the creation of new official government holidays. Some of these were: Hitler's birthday, the day the party was refounded in 1925, and a transformation of 1 May from the traditional celebration of the working class and socialist values to a "National Day of Labour," a "celebration of the national community in which employers and workers in all the various occupations and professions paraded side by side."26 For Hitler's fiftieth birthday in 1939, an account is given of the film taken to feature it in the weekly newsreel. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered for the event to see Hitler arrive, driving through rows of soldiers to the parade ground where he was given a birthday serenade by the SS and was photographed around his contemporaries, namely Himmler. A group of children dressed in white flank Hitler on both sides, "curious but well behaved," advertising to the public Hitler as a "true lover of children;" "a special shot for the women in the audience."27 The Tenets of Good Propaganda If we desire to understand how the Nazis were able to come to power, their use of propaganda must be central to the question. In a 1931 article, Goebbels stated: "The task of propaganda is not to discover a theory or to develop a program, rather to translate that theory and program into the language of the people, to make them comprehensible to the broad masses of the people."28 The broad support that the Nazis won and were able to maintain was not due to the intellectually or logically rewarding nature of their doctrine. It was due originally to the ability of their propagandists to make the party appear as if it was fighting for the desires of the people. The political theorist, the philosopher, and the idealist were nothing without propaganda, according to Goebbels. Every political victory resides in the ability of those seeking power to convince a majority of the people involved that what is being fought for should be fought for. This could not be achieved by "the multi-sidedness of scientific instruction;" good propaganda "must limit itself to a few themes and repeat them incessantly."29 It was understood that content was a non-issue, that the most decisive component of good propaganda was its presentation. In a speech given by Goebbels on 9 January 1928, ‘good propaganda' is defined as that which "over a certain period . . . can win over and fire up people for its idea."30 He further stated that propaganda must not be judged by how tasteful it is, or how intelligent the message being conveyed. It should be judged on account of its ability to win a group of people over to the side of whoever is propagating the information. The Nazis did not create propaganda to enlighten or increase the understanding of the German people to the National Socialist cause. Rather, it was a constantly changing barrage of repeated dogmas that were simple and, to some degree, true. The Nazis understood that all propaganda must contain some kernel of truth if it is to be affective. The prejudices and the realities of a mass of people must be capitalized upon, however the ideological persuasion of that group must be taken into account and have representation in the message, if it is to be effective. This central driving force was integral to the early rise of the Nazis. During the late twenties, when the National Socialist party was creating a name for itself, party leaders understood that, essentially, they were selling a product. It was necessary to make the party palatable to an extremely diverse swath of people. Presentation of causes differed wildly based upon the socio-economic, religious, age, or ethnic status of the audience. There was propaganda geared towards men, women, children, boys, girls, workers, employers, educated and non-educated, Germans and non-Germans. III. Conclusion - What Can We Learn from Nazi use of Propaganda? Every power system, if it is to be understood for what it is, must be studied objectively, without the passionate zeal that usually leads to mere condemnation. It is not important to our level of inquiry to demonize the Nazis for the crimes they committed. Surely the events of World War II are among the most horrifying, if not the most horrifying, that the Earth has ever had to endure. However, when one studies any phenomena, be it natural or not, it is counterproductive to expect any specific outcome from the study, or to expect that certain items will act or interact with other items in some particular way. And so it goes when one is studying power. It is impossible if one expects power to always do good, or if one is of the opinion that power and authority are necessary parts of our life; without which we would be a staggered mass of confusion, getting nothing done. We must not shield our inquiry with prejudice and fear. Obviously one cannot compare National Socialism and all of its horrific consequences with anything one likes to; that would be playing fast and loose with the facts. But there are certain parallels to be drawn between every power system, I would surmise, and that our own understanding of power can be greatly amplified if we understand that the ‘will to power' is something separate from anything naturally humane, and that this will is impressed upon us by experience, history, religion, our own societies, and our upbringing, among a thousand others. Therefore we must study it in the correct way; as a phenomena which we are not naturally dependent on, but is nonetheless completely dependent on us. It is immaterial to merely condemn power systems for doing horrific things, as if this should come as a surprise. That is what they have always done. That is what they will always do. I do not recoil in disbelief when I find myself soaking wet after having fallen into a body of water; water makes things wet, and it would be absurd to expect a different outcome of the situation. It is from this perspective that power must be understood, if we are to go further with it. The Nazis made use of an efficient structure in deliberating their propaganda needs. As was described above, the MPPE operated in a very strict, top-down sequence, with all local and regional propaganda offices under harsh control from above. But the genius of the system was that it allowed for personal initiative to also be a driving force in the Ministry. The low-ranking party member in Heidelberg distributing Nazi flyers at a bus station could come to understand a new important aspect of his work, and could transmit that information upwards. Ideas of how to make the machine work more efficiently were not unwelcome, as it appears in the texts. It is important to note here that the Nazis started out, and for roughly the first decade of their existence were an activist party. They depended on young foot soldiers in the field, making use of their youthful energy to spread the gospel of the Fuhrer. As this machine grew ever larger, the Nazis were able to impress upon a war-weary, humiliated, financially desperate nation that they could be ‘great' again, that the only way out of the post-Versailles slump was outright militancy and vigilance. They didn't start out killing everyone in sight. They didn't fight for any real purpose. The Nazis could be anything at anytime, to anyone. This, besides the structure described above, is what made the Nazis so effective in their quest for power. Any and all actual logical solutions to the problems Germany faced were left out, they were unimportant. The most important thing that the Nazis did was to never explain any type of concrete political doctrine, there was no actual plan to solve any of Germany's problems. The writings of Adolph Hitler are mostly quite prophetic-sounding, very poetic and eloquent. The problem is that nothing he says makes any sense, from one page or sentence to the next. It sounds powerful, confident, and operatic, but content-wise it doesn't amount to anything more than the mutter of a crazy person. Propaganda will always be a necessary tool for any power system. Hitler understood this from the beginning. Even he had to secure some degree of support from the masses, at least at first, and had to keep up an image that was omnipotent and consistent. Although use of the word ‘propaganda' has slowly disappeared from our lexicon, it still is very alive and quite well. In fact, it's a multi-billion dollar industry, but the technology and the means of presentation are drastically different now than they ever have been, especially in America. Nowadays propaganda takes on a private form, seemingly benign, mostly apolitical. Not unlike the billboard described at the beginning of this paper. Or any other advertisement one would see, anywhere in the world. Government is not needed anymore to create the images, opinions, and preferences that it would so desire its citizenry to have. This is the job of the private corporations, the massmedia; talk radio, sitcoms, cable news, Hollywood films, and multinational conglomerates such as CBS, Knight Ridder, and AOL- Time Warner. Propaganda always has to serve some purpose. For the Nazis, propaganda served their purposes of whipping up war fever, hatred of the Jews, a sense of nationalism, and a host of others. Its purpose is not merely to control; it is to frame the world in a particular way that is preferential to the elite holders of power who form policies, control money, and administrative structures in our lives. In more modern times, at a non-political level, propaganda serves the purpose of inspiring in people the need to buy things. The sitcoms and films that people watch night after night on television indirectly prescribe a particular way of life and a particular way of image for that life. It would be difficult to find a sitcom about the working class, or a normal Arab family, or someone who spends their time off work to participate in local community activism. In fact, these perfectly common scenarios won't be found in TV-land. Everything that is to be seen on television has to be beautiful, funny, rich, colorful, happy, and devoid of any real-life stress that plagues most of the 300 million people in the richest country in the world. This is called a diversion. Why get involved in your community, or get to know your next-door neighbors, when your entire free time is lived vicariously through a TV screen, or a celebrity magazine? It always amazes me when I watch family members or friends get together, and instead of talking about what is really going on in their lives, what they are going through, they talk about what happened on some sitcom, or some football game, or something completely removed from anything that might contain a shred of consequence or real-life importance for them. There are billions of dollars being spent on this entertainment for several quite important reasons. Its not because people necessarily enjoy watching Friends rather than doing something about the fact that the old woman next door just might be freezing to death or without food. That's a staggeringly inhuman outlook, but it is entirely banal and common to us. We don't use the word propaganda anymore, which in itself is an ironic, Orwellian phenomenon. If we don't start opening up our eyes and taking a look at what's being sold, advertised, and celebrated, there is no telling when we will snap out of this consumerist lethargy. Goebbels would be astounded if he were around today, and saw what type of empire of entertainment we have created. We do it better than he would have ever imagined. Part of this is due to technology; part of it is due to the fact that Americans have to be the most indoctrinated people in the world, because we probably hold more latent control over the things our government does than any other nation in the world. Its not so strange when you take everything into perspective at the same time. Instead of programming that is conveying the message that all Jews and Communists are evil and must be done away with, we are subjected to programming that teaches us that our lives will be worthless unless we have nice clothes, nice hair, nice bodies, and nice things. Its quite good for the economy, but it has quite a deleterious effect on our spiritual awareness and psychological well-being. These are the most important things that we can learn from Nazi Propaganda-how they used it, why they used it, and to use this knowledge to shine it on our own lives. ENDNOTES